Neither Revolution Nor Reform: A New Strategy for the
Left
For over a century, liberals and
radicals have seen the possibility of change in capitalist systems from one of
two perspectives: the reform tradition assumes that corporate institutions
remain central to the system but believes that regulatory policies can contain,
modify, and control corporations and their political allies. The revolutionary
tradition assumes that change can come about only if corporate institutions are
eliminated or transcended during an acute crisis, usually but not always by
violence.
But
what happens if a system neither reforms nor collapses in crisis?
Quietly, a different kind of progressive
change is emerging, one that involves a transformation in institutional
structures and power, a process one could call “evolutionary reconstruction.”
At the height of the financial crisis in early 2009, some kind of
nationalization of the banks seemed possible. “The public hates bankers right
now,” the Brookings Institution’s Douglas Elliot observed. “Truthfully, you
would find considerable support for hanging a number of bankers…” It was a
moment, Barack Obama told banking CEOs, when his administration was “the only
thing between you and the pitchforks.” But the president opted for a soft bailout
engineered by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and White House economic
adviser Lawrence Summers. Whereas Franklin Roosevelt attacked the “economic
royalists” and built and mobilized his political base, Obama entered office
with an already organized base and largely ignored it.
When the next financial crisis occurs, and it
will, a different political opportunity may be possible. One option has already
been put on the table: in 2010, thirty-three senators voted to break up large
Wall Street investment banks that were “too big to fail.” Such a policy would
not only reduce financial vulnerability; it would alter the structure of
institutional power.
Still, breaking up banks, even if successful,
isn’t the end of the process. The modern history of the financial industry, to
say nothing of anti-trust strategies in general, suggests that the big banks
would ultimately regroup and reconcentrate and restore their domination of the
system. So what can be done when “breaking them up” fails?
The potentially explosive power of public
anger at financial institutions surfaced in May 2010 when the Senate voted by a
96-0 margin to audit the Federal Reserve’s lending (a provision included
ultimately in the Dodd-Frank legislation, which was designed to protect American
taxpayers and consumers from financial corruption and to make the financial
system more accountable)—something that had never been done before. Traditional
reforms have aimed at improved regulation, higher reserve requirements, and the
channeling of credit to key sectors. But future crises may feature a spectrum
of sophisticated proposals for more radical change offered by figures on both
the left and right. For instance, a “Limited Purpose Banking” strategy put
forward by conservative economist Laurence Kolticoff would impose a 100-percent
reserve requirement on banks. Because banks typically provide loans in amounts
many times their reserves, this would transform them into modest institutions
with little or no capacity to finance speculation. It would also nationalize
the creation of all new money as federal authorities, rather than the banks,
would directly control system-wide financial flows. A variety of respected
liberal as well as conservative economists have welcomed this
strategy—including five Nobel laureates in economics.
On the left, the economist Fred Moseley has
proposed that for banks deemed too big to fail “permanent nationalization with
bonds-to-stocks swaps for bondholders is the most equitable solution…”
Nationally owned banks, he argues, would provide a basis for “a more stable and
public-oriented banking system in the future.” Most striking is the argument of
Willem Buiter, the chief economist of Citigroup no less, that if the public
underwrites the costs of bailouts, “banks should be in public ownership…” In
fact, had the taxpayer funds used to bail out major financial institutions in
2007–2010 been provided on condition that voting stock be issued in return for
the investment, one or more major banks would, in fact, have become essentially
publicly controlled banks.
Unknown to most Americans, there have been a
large number of small and medium-sized public banking institutions for some
time now. They have financed small businesses, renewable energy, co-ops,
housing, infrastructure, and other specifically targeted areas. There are also
7,500 community-based credit unions. Further precedents for public banking
range from Small Business Administration loans to the activities of the
U.S.-dominated World Bank. In fact, the federal government already operates 140
banks and quasi-banks that provide loans and loan guarantees for an
extraordinary range of domestic and international economic activities. Through
its various farm, housing, electricity, cooperative and other loans, the
Department of Agriculture alone operates the equivalent of the seventh largest
bank in America.
The economic crisis has also produced
widespread interest in the Bank of North Dakota, a highly successful
state-owned bank founded in 1919 when the state was governed by legislators
belonging to the left-populist Nonpartisan League. Over the past fourteen
years, the bank has returned $340 million in profits to the state and has broad
support in the business community as well as among progressive activists.
Legislative proposals to establish banks patterned in whole or in part on the
North Dakota model have been put forward by activists and legislators in
Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Montana, Illinois,
Louisiana, New York, Maryland, Virginia, Maine, and Massachusetts. In Oregon,
with strong support from a coalition of farmers, small-business owners, and
community bankers, and backed by State Treasurer Ted Wheeler, a variation on
the theme, “a virtual state bank” (that is, one that has no storefronts but
channels state-backed capital to support other banks) is likely to be formed in
the near future. How far the various strategies may develop is likely to depend
on the intensity of future financial crises, the degree of social and economic
pain and political anger in general, and the capacity of a new politics to
focus citizen anger in support of major institutional reconstruction and
democratization.
That a long era of social and economic
austerity and failing reform might paradoxically open the way to more populist
or radical institutional change—including various forms of public ownership—is
also suggested by emerging developments in health care. Here the next stage of
change is already under way. At first, it is likely to be harmful. Republican
efforts to cut back the mostly unrealized benefits of the Affordable Care Act,
passed in 2010, provide one example of this. The first stages, however, are not
likely to be the last. Polls show overwhelming distrust of and deep hostility
toward insurance companies. We can also expect public outrage to be fueled by
stories like that of fifty-nine-year-old James Verone who attempted to rob a
bank in Gastonia, North Carolina this year—but only, he made clear, for one
dollar. The reason: unemployed and without health insurance, Verone simply saw
no way other than going to jail to get health care for a growth on his chest,
foot difficulties, and back problems.
Cost pressures are building in ways that will
also continue to undermine corporations facing global competitors, forcing them
to seek new solutions. A recent report from the federal Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (“National Health Expenditure Projections, 2009–2019”)
projects health care costs to rise from the 2010 level of 17.5 percent of GDP
to 19.6 percent in 2019. It has long been clear that the central question is to
what extent, and at what pace, underlying cost pressures ultimately force
development of some form of single-payer system—the only serious way to deal
with the underlying problem.
A
NEW national solution is ultimately likely to come either in response to a
burst of pain-driven public outrage or more slowly through a state by state
build up to a national system. Massachusetts, of course, already has a near universal plan,
with 99.8 percent of children covered and 98.1 percent of adults. In Hawaii,
health coverage (provided mostly by nonprofit insurers) reaches 91.8 percent of
adults in large part because of a 1970s law mandating low cost insurance for
anyone working twenty hours or more a week. In Vermont, Governor Peter Shumlin
signed legislation in May 2011 creating “Green Mountain Care,” a broad effort
that would ultimately allow state residents to move into a publicly funded
insurance pool—in essence a form of single-payer insurance. Universal coverage,
dependent on a federal waiver, would begin in 2017 and possibly as early as
2014. In Connecticut, legislation approved in June 2011 created a “SustiNet”
Health Care Cabinet directed to produce a business plan for a nonprofit public
health insurance program by 2012, with the goal of offering such a plan
beginning in 2014. In California, there is a good chance a universal “Medicare
for all” bill may be on the governor’s desk for signature by mid-2012. (Similar
legislation passed by both the House and the Senate was vetoed by then-Governor
Schwarzenegger in 2006 and 2008.) In all, nearly twenty states will soon
consider bills to create one or another form of universal health care.
One can also observe a developing
institutional dynamic in the central neighborhoods of some of the nation’s
larger cities, places that have consistently suffered high levels of
unemployment and underemployment, with poverty commonly above 25 percent. In
such neighborhoods, democratizing development has also gone forward, again
paradoxically, precisely because traditional policies—in this case involving
large expenditures for jobs, housing and other necessities—have been
politically impossible. “Social enterprises” that undertake businesses in order
to support specific social missions now increasingly make up what is sometimes
called “a fourth sector” (different from the government, business, and
nonprofit sectors). Roughly 4,500 not-for-profit community development
corporations are largely devoted to housing development. There are now also
more than eleven thousand businesses owned in whole or part by their employees;
five million more individuals are involved in these enterprises than are
members of private-sector unions. Another 130 million Americans are members of
various urban, agricultural, and credit union cooperatives. In many cities,
important new “land trust” developments are underway using an institutional
form of nonprofit or municipal ownership that develops and maintains low- and
moderate-income housing.
The various institutional efforts have also
begun to develop innovative strategies that suggest broader possibilities for
change. Consider the Evergreen Cooperatives in Cleveland, Ohio, an integrated
group of worker-owned companies, supported in part by the purchasing power of
large hospitals and universities. The cooperatives include a solar installation
company, an industrial scale (and ecologically advanced) laundry, and soon a
greenhouse capable of producing more than five million heads of lettuce a year.
The Cleveland effort, which is partly modeled on the nearly 100,000 person
Mondragón cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain, is on track to create new
businesses, year by year, as time goes on. However, its goal is not simply
worker ownership, but the democratization of wealth and community-building in
general in the low-income Greater University Circle area of what was once a
thriving industrial city. Linked by a nonprofit corporation and a revolving
fund, the companies cannot be sold outside the network; they also return 10
percent of profits to help develop additional worker-owned firms in the area.
(Full disclosure: The Democracy Collaborative, which I co-founded, has played
an important role in helping develop the Cleveland effort. See
www.Community-Wealth.org for further information on this and many other local
and state efforts.)
Another innovative enterprise is Market Creek
Plaza in San Diego. There a comprehensive, community-owned project links
individual and collective wealth-building through a $23.5-million commercial
and cultural complex anchored by a shopping center. The complex has developed a
range of social and economic projects that have resulted in the employment of
more than 1,700 people. Its multicultural emphasis on the arts has helped
create several venues for common activity among the local Asian, Hispanic, and
black communities.
Significantly, these collectively owned
businesses are commonly supported by unusual local alliances, including not
only progressives; labor unions; and nonprofit and religious leaders; but also,
in many cases, the backing of local businesses and bankers. The efforts have
also attracted surprising political support. In Indiana, for example,
Republican State Treasurer Richard Mourdock has established a state linked deposit
program to provide state financing support for employee ownership. At this
writing, Ohio Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown has plans to introduce model
legislation to support the development of an initial group of Evergreen-style
efforts in diverse parts of the country. Environmental concerns are also
involved; many of the enterprises are “green” by design, increasingly so as
time goes on. Cleveland’s Evergreen laundry, which uses less than a third the
amount of water used by comparable commercial firms, is one of the most
ecologically advanced in the Midwest. In Washington state, Coastal Community
Action (CCA) operates a portfolio of housing, food, health, and employment
programs for low-income residents that uses development and ownership of a
fourteen million dollar wind turbine to generate income to support its social
service programs.
Yet another sphere of institutional growth
centers on land development. By maintaining direct ownership of areas
surrounding transit station exits, public agencies in Washington, D.C.,
Atlanta, and other cities earn millions capturing the increased land values
their transit investments create. The town of Riverview, Michigan, has been a
national leader in trapping methane from its landfills and using it to fuel
electricity generation, thereby providing both revenues and jobs. There are
roughly five hundred similar projects nationwide. Many cities have established
municipally owned hotels. There are also over two thousand publicly owned
utilities that provide power (and, increasingly, broadband services) to more
than forty-five million Americans, in the process generating $50 billion in
annual revenue. Significant public institutions are also common at the state
level. CalPERS, California’s public pension authority, helps finance local
community development needs; in Alaska, state oil revenues provide each citizen
with dividends from public investment strategies as a matter of right; in
Alabama, public pension investing has long focused on state economic
development (including employee-owned firms).
ALTHOUGH PUBLIC ownership is surprisingly
widespread, it can also be vulnerable to challenge. The fiscal crisis, and
conservative resistance to raising taxes, has led some mayors and governors to
sell off public assets. In Indiana, Governor Mitch Daniels sold the Indiana
Toll Road to Spanish and Australian investors. In Chicago, then-Mayor Richard
Daley privatized parking meters and toll collection on the Chicago Skyway and
even proposed selling off recycling collection, equipment maintenance, and the
annual “Taste of Chicago” festival. How far continuing financial and political
pressures may lead other officials to attempt to secure revenues by selling off
public assets is an open question. Public resistance to such strategies, although
less widely publicized, has been surprisingly strong in many areas. Toll road
sales have been held up in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and newly elected
Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel recently voiced his opposition to an attempt to
privatize Midway Airport as previously attempted by Daley. An effort to
transfer city-owned parking garages to private ownership in Los Angeles also
failed when residents and business leaders realized parking rates would spike
if the deal went through.
One thing is certain: traditional liberalism,
dependent on expensive federal policies and strong labor unions, is moribund.
The government no longer has much capacity to use progressive taxation to
achieve the goal of equity or to regulate corporations effectively.
Congressional deadlocks on such matters are the rule, not the exception. At the
same time, ongoing economic stagnation or mild upturns followed by further
decay, and “real” unemployment rates in the 15 percent to 16 percent range
appear more likely than a return to booming economic times.
IRONICALLY, THIS grim
new order may open the way for the kinds of “evolutionary reconstructive”
institutional change described here. Since the Great Depression, liberal
activists and policy makers have implicitly assumed they were providing one or
another form of “countervailing power” against large corporations. But
institutional reconstruction aims either to weaken or displace corporate power. Strategies like
anti-trust or efforts to “break up” big banks aim to weaken. Public banking,
municipal utilities, and single-payer health plans attempt to displace
privately owned companies. At the same time, community-based enterprises offer
public officials alternatives to paying large tax-incentive bribes to big
corporations.
Of course, “evolutionary reconstruction” might
fail, as have most kinds of top-down national reform. The era of stalemate and
decay might continue and worsen. Like ancient Rome, the United States could
simply decline and fall, unable to address its social ills.
However, even during a sustained era of
stalemate and decay, it may be possible to develop a coherent long-term
progressive strategic direction. Such a direction would build upon the
remaining energies of traditional liberal reform, animated over time by new
populist anger and movements aimed at confronting corporate power, the extreme
concentration of income, failing public services, the ecological crisis, and
military adventurism. And it would explicitly advocate the construction of new
institutions run by people committed to developing an expansively democratic
polity, thereby giving political voice to the new constituencies emerging
alongside the new developments at the same time it helps to begin altering
underlying institutional power balances.
In connection with environmental issues, at
least, some “capitalists” also seem willing to sign onto this vision. New
organizations like the Business Alliance for Local Living Economies (BALLE) and
the American Sustainable Business Council (ASBC) have been quietly developing momentum
in recent years. BALLE, which has more than 22,000 small business members,
works to promote sustainable local community development. ASBC (which includes
BALLE as a member) is an advocacy and lobbying effort that involves more than
150,000 business professionals and 30 separate business organizations committed
to sustainability. Leading White House figures and such Cabinet-level officials
as Labor Secretary Hilda Solis have welcomed the organization as a counter to
the national Chamber of Commerce. (Jeffrey Hollender, chair of ASBC’s Business
Leadership Council and former CEO of Seventh Generation, has denounced the
Chamber for “fighting democracy and destroying America’s economic future”
because of its opposition to climate change legislation and its support for the
Citizens United decision.) Gus Speth, a member of ASBC’s Advisory Board (and
former environmental adviser to Presidents Carter and Clinton) offers a more
far-reaching general perspective: “For the most part, we have worked within
this current system of political economy, but working within the system will
not succeed in the end when what is needed is transformative change in the
system itself.”
AT THE heart of the spectrum of emerging
institutional change is the traditional radical principle that the ownership of
capital should be subject to democratic control. In a nation where 1 percent of
the population owns nearly as much wealth as the entire bottom half of the
nation, this principle may be particularly appealing to the young—the people who
will shape the next political era. In 2009, even as Republicans assailed
President Obama and his liberal allies as immoral “socialists,” a Rasmussen
poll reported that Americans under thirty were “essentially evenly divided” as
to whether they preferred “capitalism” or “socialism.” Even if many were unsure
about what “socialism” is, they were clearly open to something new, whatever it
might be called. A non-statist, community-building, institution-changing,
democratizing strategy might well capture their imagination and channel their
desire to heal the world. It is surely a positive direction to pursue. Just
possibly, it could open the way to an era of true progressive renewal, even one
day perhaps step-by-step systemic change or the kind of unexpected, explosive,
movement-building power evidenced in the “Arab Spring” and, historically, in
our own civil rights, feminist, and other great movements.
Sumber : http://www.neweconomyworkinggroup.org/article/neither-revolution-nor-reform-new-strategy-left
- Neither Revolution Nor Reform: A New Strategy for the Left
Translate : Baik
Revolusi juga Reformasi: Strategi Baru untuk Kiri
- But what happens if a system neither reforms nor collapses in crisis?
Translate : Tapi apa yang terjadi jika sistem tidak reformasi atau
runtuh dalam krisis?
- A NEW national solution is ultimately likely to come either in response to a burst of pain-driven public outrage or more slowly through a state by state build up to a national system.
Translate : Sebuah solusi nasional BARU pada akhirnya akan datang
baik dalam menanggapi ledakan sakit berbasis kemarahan publik atau lebih lambat
melalui sebuah negara oleh negara membangun hingga sistem nasional.